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MANAGING A CORRECTIONAL MARKETPLACE: 
PRISON PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
David E. Pozen∗ 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With two of the largest prison populations per capita in the 
Western world, the United States and the United Kingdom1 are also 
global leaders in the privatization of their prison systems.  At year-
end 2001, privately operated prisons held over 6.5 percent of 
America’s state and federal adult correctional facility population, 
representing more than 90,000 offenders.2  And in June 2001, 
privately operated prisons held almost 9.4 percent of Britain’s total 
adult correctional facility population, representing more than 6,000 
offenders.3  Scotland, Holland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
                                                
∗ M.Sc., Oxford University (Comparative Social Policy); B.A., Yale University (Economics).  
The author currently teaches management at Payap University in Chiang Mai, Thailand.  The 
author thanks Louise Locock and George Smith from Oxford’s Department of Social Policy 
and Social Work and Roger Hood from Oxford’s Centre for Criminological Research for their 
helpful comments and suggestions.  The author also wishes to acknowledge Patrick Bayer from 
Yale University’s Department of Economics and John Simon from the Yale Law School for 
many informative conversations concerning private prisons and prison regulation more 
generally.    
1 “United Kingdom” and “Britain” as used in this paper refer to England and Wales, which 
maintain a common prison system. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate prison 
systems, and are not considered here. 
2 Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 
Prisoners in 2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 1, 8 (Table 9) (July 2002), available at 
http://www.ojb.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p01.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).    
3 Calculated from HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, PRISON STATISTICS: ENGLAND 
AND WALES 2001 35 (Table 1.18) (2003) and HM Prison Service, Privately Managed Prisons, at 
http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/corporate/dynpage.asp?Page=123 (last visited Nov. 5, 
2003).  Note that Blakenhurst was still privately operated in June 2001.  HM Prison Service, 
Prison Service to Run Manchester and Blakenhurst Prisons, Jan. 12, 2001, at n.2, available at 
http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?197 (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).  
Australia has the greatest proportion of its prisoners in private prisons (about 20 percent), but 
this represents fewer individuals in such prisons (about 4,000) than in the United States or the 
United Kingdom.  The bulk of the literature on correctional privatization has focused on the 
United States and the United Kingdom, and the leading corporate operators of prisons have 
generally come from these two countries, particularly from the United States.  See COMPETITION 
COMMISSION, GROUP 4 FALCK A/S AND THE WACKENHUT CORPORATION: A REPORT ON THE 
MERGER SITUATION 3.131-3.148 (2002), available at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2002/471group4.htm#full (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).   
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and Canada have also recently witnessed the advent of private 
prisons, while the Republic of Ireland, Latvia, Serbia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Tanzania, Costa Rica, 
Jamaica, Panama, and several South American countries are all 
purportedly giving active consideration to the idea.4  In less than two 
decades, private prisons have become a significant component of 
penal theory and administration around the world. 
Privatization of prisons can take a variety of forms, spanning from 
no facility ownership and partial operational administration to total 
facility ownership and total operational administration by the private 
contractor.  In all existing privatization schemes, the state retains full 
responsibility for allocating punishment in the sentencing phase, but 
it delegates the responsibility for delivering imprisonment services to 
a nongovernmental entity.  In theory, “private prisons” could 
encompass those run by private nonprofit organizations as well as 
private for-profit ones, but in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom there are at present no secure correctional facilities for 
adults run by nonprofits.5  The debate over private prisons has 
focused on cases in which for-profit corporations assume complete 
managerial control over a prison. 
It has been quite a debate:  since their beginnings in the mid-
1980s and the early 1990s, respectively, the prison privatization 
movements of the United States and the United Kingdom have 
provoked several rounds of congressional and parliamentary 
hearings and hundreds of articles discussing their philosophical, 
organizational, economic, and legal implications.6  Yet while there 
                                                
4 Richard Harding, Private Prisons, in 28 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 265, 
268-69 (Michael H. Tonry ed., 2001). 
5 In the juvenile sector, by contrast, nonprofit organizations have “played a long and 
distinguished role in operating [correctional] facilities” in the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, in the United Kingdom.  DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD ET AL., ABT ASSOCIATES INC., PRIVATE 
PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE 5 (1998), available at 
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/priv-report.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003) (describing 
nonprofits’ role in American juvenile correctional administration); see also MICK RYAN & TONY 
WARD, PRIVATIZATION AND THE PENAL SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND THE DEBATE IN 
BRITAIN 64-67 (1989) (describing nonprofits’ role in British juvenile correctional 
administration).  By 1990, almost 90 percent of U.S. states had at least one contract with a 
private nonprofit corporation to operate a juvenile correctional facility.  Robert B. Levinson & 
William J. Taylor, ACA Studies Privatization in Juvenile Corrections, 53 CORRECTIONS TODAY 242, 
248 (1991). 
6 Notable scholarly contributions on prison privatization in the United States include: 
CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS (1990); MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 5; 
IRA P. ROBBINS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE 
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remains a contingent of vocal critics of private prisons in both 
countries today, the debate over privatization has lost much of its 
early ardor and prominence as the industry has reached a level of 
maturity over the course of the past decade.  After the initial flurry of 
academic and popular commentary on American private prisons in 
the 1980s, public discussion had largely died down by 1990.7  Pushed 
back seven years or so, the literature in Britain experienced a similar 
recession of interest in the topic.  As the number and variety of 
privately operated prisons have steadily increased, they have come to 
be seen by many in the United States and the United Kingdom as a 
natural part of the correctional system.  Inaugurated under 
conservative administrations, private prisons were able to withstand 
the election of the center-left governments of Bill Clinton and Tony 
Blair, even though in the latter case the Labour Party had gone on 
record in the mid-1990s promising that all private prisons would be 
returned to the public sector once their present contracts expired.8  
                                                                                                            
INCARCERATION (1988); MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1993); DAVID SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE 
PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS (1995); Christine Bowditch & Ronald S. Everett, Private Prisons: 
Problems within the Solution, 4 JUST. Q. 441 (1987); Samuel J. Brakel, “Privatization” in Corrections: 
Radical Prison Chic or Mainstream Americana?, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1 
(1988); John J. DiIulio, Jr., What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, 92 PUB. INT. 66 (1988); Brian E. 
Evans, Private Prisons, 36 EMORY L.J. 253 (1987); Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An 
Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1987); Connie Mayer, Legal 
Issues Surrounding Private Operation of Prisons, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 309 (1986); Ira P. Robbins, 
Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813 (1987); Emanuel S. Savas, 
Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1987); Mary R. Woolley, Prisons for Profit: Policy 
Considerations for Government Officials, 90 DICK. L. REV. 307 (1985).  Notable contributions on 
privatization in the United Kingdom include: RYAN & WARD, supra note 5; Shaheen Borna, Free 
Enterprise Goes to Prison, 26 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 321 (1986); J. Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, An 
International Perspective on Privatisation of Corrections, 31 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 174 (1992); J. 
Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, The Corrections-Commercial Complex, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 150 
(1993); Paul Moyle, Separating the Allocation of Punishment from Its Administration: Theoretical and 
Empirical Observations, 41 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 77 (2001); Robert G. Porter, The Privatisation of 
Prisons in the United States: A Policy That Britain Should Not Emulate, 29 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 65 
(1990); Andrew Rutherford, British Penal Policy and the Idea of Prison Privatization, in PRIVATE 
PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 42 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990); Mick Ryan, Evaluating 
and Responding to Private Prisons in the United Kingdom, 21 INT. J. SOC. L. 319 (1993); Mick Ryan 
& Tony Ward, Privatization and the Penal System: Britain Misinterprets the American Experience, 14 
CRIM. JUST. REV. 1 (1989); Richard Sparks, Can Prisons Be Legitimate?: Penal Politics, Privatization, 
and the Timeliness of an Old Idea, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 14 (1994); Robert P. Weiss, Private 
Prisons and the State, in PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 24 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989). 
7 Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means: The Re-emergence of Private 
Prisons and Jails in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
29, 31 (1994). 
8 In a March 1995 speech to a prisoners’ aid society, Labour’s shadow Home Secretary Jack 
Straw declared that he regarded “the privatisation of the prison service as morally repugnant” 
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Labour’s ultimate acceptance of private prisons provides an 
indication of how entrenched they have become; when Labour took 
power in 1997, Richard Harding observed at the time, private prisons 
were already “a proven option in the UK and . . . integral to the 
overall system.”9  
However, even as prison privatization has entered the 
criminological mainstream and the controversy has largely faded 
from the public eye, nothing resembling consensus has emerged 
regarding the desirability or even the performance of private prisons.  
Critics remain adamant that allowing people to profit from 
punishment is unacceptable on moral or symbolic grounds; they fear 
the practical consequences of privatization on the quality of prison 
regimes; and they decry the formation of a “prison-industrial 
complex” potentially undermining correctional administration and 
corrupting correctional policy.  At the same time, privatization 
supporters are convinced of its fiscal benefits; they insist private 
prisons are more accountable and better managed than public 
prisons; and they think privatization brings much-needed innovation 
and competitive pressure to a traditionally inefficient, union-heavy 
industry. 
At the cusp of this second phase of prison privatization—in which 
the terms of the debate have shifted from whether we should allow 
private prisons to how we can best manage them—it is important to 
assess the efficacy and effects of the privatization schemes currently 
in existence.  After a decade of steady growth in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, privately operated prisons can no longer 
be seen as just an experiment.  Policymakers in these countries (and 
beyond) need to evaluate the successes and failures of their 
approaches to privatization in light of the alternative administrative 
models that have been utilized.  It is unfortunate, therefore, that in 
the vast literature on prison privatization there have been “few 
explicitly comparative works”10 thus far.  A comparative 
                                                                                                            
and that, “[a]t the expiration of their contracts, a Labour government will bring these [existing 
private] prisons into proper public control and run them directly as public services.”  Alan 
Travis, Straw Vow  to Nationalise ‘Repugnant’ Private Jails, THE GUARDIAN, (Manchester), Mar. 8, 
1995, at 6.  
9 RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 9 (1997).  
10 Lilly & Knepper, An International Perspective, supra note 6, at 174.  Lilly and Knepper 
mention only RYAN & WARD, supra note 5; Roger Matthews, Privatization in Perspective, in 
PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989); and Ryan & Ward, Privatization 
and the Penal System, supra note 6.  The comparative work of Matthews and Ryan and Ward was 
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understanding of the history, evolution, and present status of private 
prisons in the United States and the United Kingdom can help 
reinvigorate the debate over their appropriate role in a correctional 
system, and it can help facilitate more informed regulation of all 
prisons, private and public.  
 
II.   PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN AMERICAN AND BRITISH 
CORRECTIONS, THEN AND NOW 
 
Although privatization may appear to be a relatively modern trend 
in the American and British penal systems, both countries have a 
long history of private sector involvement in prison management.11  
At various points throughout the nineteenth century, state 
governments in the United States contracted out the operation of 
their correctional facilities to private entrepreneurs, who would then 
utilize convict labor for profit.  In 1825, Kentucky became the first 
state to employ a private contractor to manage its entire correctional 
facility system, and by the end of the Civil War the majority of 
southern states had followed suit.  In the latter stages of the 1800s, 
however, private prisons came under attack from a broad coalition of 
workers who argued against convict labor as unfair competition and 
from reformers who protested the poor conditions of confinement in 
private facilities.  By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
government had assumed responsibility for imprisonment and most 
other criminal justice functions, and private entrepreneurs no longer 
managed any adult correctional facilities. 
In the United Kingdom, there was a significant private sector role 
in corrections in the eighteenth century, but the state took over the 
management of all prisons in the early nineteenth century.  Most 
local authorities then owned and ran the prisons within their 
jurisdictions until the 1877 Prisons Act centralized the administration 
of English and Welsh prisons under the London-based Prison 
Commission, which was absorbed in 1963 as part of the Home 
                                                                                                            
later augmented by Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4 and McDonald, Public Imprisonment by 
Private Means, supra note 7. 
11 See generally BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INTENTIONS 
(1977); Borna, supra note 6; John G. DiPiano, Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the 
Twenty-first Century, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 171 (1995). 
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Office.12  Despite Jeremy Bentham’s persistent advocacy from 1787 to 
1811 for privately run prisons he called Panopticons, he was 
ultimately unable to persuade the governments of Pitt and Younger 
to implement his scheme.  Since the decisive rejection of Bentham’s 
plan by a parliamentary select committee in 1811, the United 
Kingdom has, by and large, subscribed to a model of public 
management “involving some unsalaried people of reputed probity 
(e.g., visiting magistrates) and a large proportion of publicly salaried 
staff.  This came about because it was assumed that the state alone 
was competent to prevent neglect and cruelty and to create and 
maintain reformatory systems of prison discipline.”13 
Privatization reemerged in prison management when American 
municipal and state governments began to contract with private firms 
to run county jails and state prisons in the mid-1980s.  After the 
demise of privately operated prisons at the end of the nineteenth 
century, federal and state governments in the United States had 
continued to employ private companies to provide a variety of 
specific services to correctional facilities such as food production, 
educational programs, vocational training, and counseling.14  Since 
the 1960s, the Federal Bureau of Prisons had been contracting with 
private firms to run community treatment centers and halfway houses 
to which federal prisoners were transferred prior to parole, and since 
1979 the Immigration and Naturalization Service had been 
contracting with private firms to run detention centers for suspected 
illegal immigrants.  These developments, in low-security 
environments at the fringes of the U.S. penal system, “provoked little 
controversy or even notice.”15  The return to the full-fledged 
management of correctional facilities by private firms, however, 
aroused an immediate reaction.  Congress held hearings on prison 
privatization in 1986, and almost every criminal justice professional 
association took a stand on the issue.  Despite the protests of many, 
privatization in the United States has continued apace since then, 
with the capacity of private secure adult correctional facilities 
                                                
12 The Home Office managed British prisons directly from 1963 until 1993, when the 
modern Prison Service was instituted. 
13 Bill Forsythe, Privatization and British Prisons—Past and Future, 73 PRISON SERVICE J. 35, 36 
(1989). 
14 CAMILLE G. CAMP & GEORGE M. CAMP, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRIVATE SECTOR 
INVOLVEMENT IN PRISON SERVICES AND OPERATIONS 6 (1984). 
15 McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means, supra note 7, at 30. 
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increasing 856 percent between 1991 and 1998.16  By the end of 
1999, fourteen corporations were operating over 150 private 
correctional facilities for adults in the United States,17 earning 
combined annual revenues in excess of a billion dollars. 
The (re-)privatization of prisons came slightly later to the United 
Kingdom, officially beginning in 1991 when Group 4 Remand 
Services Limited (now Group 4 Prison Services Limited) won the 
contract to run the new Wolds remand prison, which opened in 
1992.  Proposals for private prisons had first surfaced in the United 
Kingdom in 1984 and 1985,18 though like its American counterpart 
the British government had been contracting with private firms for 
the detention of suspected illegal immigrants since 1970.  After a visit 
to private prisons in the United States, the Home Affairs Committee 
of the House of Commons recommended in March 1987 an 
experiment with the private management and construction of 
custodial institutions.19  This report was followed by a Home Office 
Green Paper20 and a government-commissioned consulting study21 
that both recommended contracting with private firms to design, 
construct, and operate remand prisons, and another Green Paper22 
in 1990 that adopted most of the consultants’ recommendations.  
The Criminal Justice Act 1991 provided enabling legislation for 
prison privatization, granting the Home Office the power to contract 
out the management of new prisons for unsentenced (remand) 
inmates.  This act was extended in 1992 to encompass sentenced 
prisoners as well,23 and again in 1993 to enable the contracting out of 
                                                
16 GAYLENE STYVE ARMSTRONG, PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC OPERATION OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES 2 (2001). 
17 Charles W. Thomas, Private Adult Correctional Facility Census: A “Real-Time” Statistical 
Profile, December 31, 1999 (1999), at http://www.crim.ufl.edu/pcp/census/1999/ (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2003).   
18 ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, THE OMEGA FILE: JUSTICE POLICY (1984); SEAN MCCONVILLE & 
ERYL HALL-WILLIAMS, TAWNEY SOCIETY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A RADICAL RETHINK (1985). 
19 HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FOURTH REPORT: CONTRACT 
PROVISION OF PRISONS (1987). 
20 HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE REMAND 
SYSTEM (1988). 
21 DELOITTE, HASKINS & SELLS, A REPORT TO THE HOME OFFICE ON THE PRACTICALITY OF 
PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE REMAND SYSTEM (1989). 
22 HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CRIME, JUSTICE AND PROTECTING THE PUBLIC 
(1990). 
23 Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Contracted Out Prisons) Order 1992. 
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existing prisons.24  By April 1994 there were three private prisons 
holding inmates in the United Kingdom, at Wolds, Blakenhurst, and 
Doncaster.  Following these initial three “management only” private 
prisons, the Prison Service moved to a so-called DCMF (Design, 
Construct, Manage, and Finance) model of privatization, with all new 
private prisons built and operated by contractors under the Private 
Finance Initiative.  Today there are nine private prisons out of 138 
total25 in the United Kingdom, and the Prison Service is currently 
receiving bids for two more.26   
The British prison system, overseen by the Home Office and 
carried out by the Prison Service, is run entirely by central 
government and financed out of general taxation.  The United 
States, by contrast, has a three-tier system of prison administration:  
the Federal Bureau of Prisons oversees federal prisons, each state 
(and the District of Columbia) oversees its own prisons, and most of 
the 3,000 or so counties and some cities run their own local jails.27  
The American correctional system, in addition to being much larger 
than the British system, thus features a much greater degree of 
diversity and fragmentation.28  In the United States, 12.3 percent of 
federal prisoners and 5.8 percent of state prisoners were being held 
in privately operated facilities at the end of 2001.29  Private state 
prisons are concentrated in the South and the West, where organized 
labor is weak and fiscal conservatism strong, with Texas holding the 
most inmates in such facilities by far (16,331 in 2001), followed by 
Oklahoma (6,658), Georgia (4,561), California (4,452), and Florida 
(3,995).30  At midyear 1999, 2.3 percent of jail inmates in the United 
                                                
24 Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Contracted Out Prisons) Order 1993. 
25 This figure does not include the Immigration Removal Centre Haslar. 
26 HM Prison Service, Privately Managed Prisons, supra note 3. 
27 Jails in the United States hold people awaiting trial or sentencing or serving a sentence 
of typically less than one year.  Most jails are under the control of independently elected 
sheriffs.  JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
CENSUS OF JAILS, 1999 5 (2001).   
28 Beyond adult corrections, the American prison system also exhibits more diversity and 
fragmentation—and more privatization—in its treatment of juvenile offenders.  In October 
1999, 1,794 of the 3,712 residential juvenile correctional facilities in the United States were 
privately operated.  Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Juvenile Offenders in Residential Placement: 1997-1999, 7 JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: NATIONAL REPORT SERIES 1, 1 (Mar. 2002). 
29 Harrison & Beck, supra note 2, at 8 (Table 9). 
30 Id. at 8 (Table 9). 
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States, or 13,814 individuals, were also being held in privately 
operated facilities.31 
 
III.  WHY PRIVATIZATION? 
 
The prison privatization movements of the United States and the 
United Kingdom were driven by a common set of factors—concerns 
over rapidly rising incarcerated populations and their associated 
costs, problems with prison overcrowding and perceptions of a crisis 
in corrections, and the government’s ideological preference for 
encouraging free enterprise and diminishing the role of unionized 
labor—but the relative weight of these factors varied between the two 
countries.  In the United States, strains to the prison system created 
by the growth of the inmate population were more severe, and the 
desire of public officials to save money and expand capacity more 
quickly through privatization was stronger.  In the United Kingdom, 
the New Right’s broad commitment to privatizing government 
services and its desire to undermine the Prison Officers’ Association 
were key additional factors in stimulating private prisons.  Lobbying 
by U.S.-based correctional corporations may have helped open up 
the British market for private prisons to some extent, but there is no 
evidence that these efforts shaped policymaking, as the Home Office 
undertook prison privatization in a highly cautious, controlled 
manner over many years.32 
More broadly, although the United Kingdom’s privatization 
movement paralleled and drew on the United States’ movement in a 
number of significant ways, it remained a separate phenomenon.  
When it became clear that the United Kingdom would begin to 
experiment with private prisons, many commentators echoed Robert 
Porter’s pronouncement that the “time-honoured cliché that what 
happens in America today happens in Britain tomorrow would seem 
to be ringing true once again.”33  Yet the amount of direct policy 
transfer was small, and the traffic of ideas was always dialectic, a two-
way flow.  For example, the United Kingdom’s Adam Smith Institute, 
                                                
31 STEPHAN, supra note 27, at 6 (Table 9). 
32 See Jamie Bennett, Private Prisons and Public Benefit: The Impact and Future of Privately 
Operated Prisons, 135 PRISON SERVICE J. 40, 40-43 (2001); McDonald, Public Imprisonment by 
Private Means, supra note 7, at 32-35, 42. 
33 Porter, supra note 6, at 65. 
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though supported with American money from the Heritage 
Foundation, also maintained a U.S. office that promoted British free-
market correctional initiatives to the American public.34  British 
politicians did not simply transplace American ideas and policies into 
the U.K. correctional system, nor could they have given its vastly 
different structure from that of the United States.35  After the initial 
presentation of the privatization option by the Home Affairs 
Committee,36 the Home Office spent over four years before inviting 
private firms to tender for the first management contract in 1991.  In 
that interim period, it sponsored a number of studies and hearings to 
assess the possible costs and benefits of private prisons,37 and the 
approach it ultimately took to privatization—with output-based 
contracts, multiple levels of monitoring, and market testing for 
existing Prison Service facilities—departed from the American model 
in substantive ways.  Thus, while the United States’ experience with 
prison privatization in the 1980s set an important precedent and 
helped launch the idea onto the British political agenda, it did not in 
and of itself constitute a motivation or guideline for privatization in 
the United Kingdom. 
 
A.  Pragmatic Considerations 
As incarcerated populations in the United States and the United 
Kingdom increased throughout the last three decades of the 
twentieth century, public prisons found themselves increasingly 
unable to cope.  In the United States, rising crime rates, stricter 
sentencing laws, the War on Drugs, and efforts to combat illegal 
immigration all helped contribute to a massive increase in the 
prisoner population.  Between 1973 and 1990, the number of 
                                                
34 See RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at 45. 
35 See discussion in Section II supra. 
36 HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 19.  This report cites the committee members’ 
recent experience visiting private prisons in the United States as encouraging evidence of the 
potential role for private contractors in the British prison system.  The committee members’ 
reactions to what they saw on their visit reveal how the impact of America’s privatization 
example was mediated in the United Kingdom by politicians’ party affiliations and beliefs:  all 
four Labour members of the committee voted against adopting the report, while all seven 
Conservative members of the committee voted in favor of it.  See Forsythe, supra note 13, at 35. 
37 See, e.g., DELOITTE, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 21; HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE REMAND SYSTEM (1988); HOME OFFICE FOR 
THE UNITED KINGDOM, CRIME, JUSTICE AND PROTECTING THE PUBLIC (1990); HOME OFFICE FOR 
THE UNITED KINGDOM, COURT ESCORTS, CUSTODY AND SECURITY: A DISCUSSION PAPER (1990). 
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prisoners under custody at any one time in the United States grew 
nearly fourfold.38  Many American prisons became overcrowded as a 
result, which created “acute difficulties in maintaining tolerable 
regimes or minimum standards.”39  In the 1980s, federal courts 
found large numbers of correctional facilities, and even entire state 
prison systems, to be in violation of the Constitution’s prohibition of 
“cruel and unusual punishment” because of overcrowding and 
inadequate conditions of confinement, so that by mid-1991, 40 states 
were operating prisons found by the courts to have unconstitutional 
conditions.40   
In the United Kingdom, increasing prisoner populations also led 
to a severe overcrowding problem in the 1980s;41 in the early 1980s, 
for example, a third of the offenders in custody were sharing with 
one or two others cells designed for only one person,42 and in June 
1989 Wadsworth prison in London had only eight cells with access to 
sanitation at night versus 1,149 without access.43  The British remand 
population nearly doubled between 1979 and 1988,44 and conditions 
were particularly deplorable in the remand prisons.45  Often, they 
were so overcrowded that prisoners had to be kept in police cells, 
forcing police officers to do double duty as prison officers.46 
In both countries, then, rising incarcerated populations helped 
lead to overcrowding and deteriorating conditions of confinement, 
which in turn led to demands for expanded prison capacity and 
                                                
38 McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means, supra note 7, at 37.  See also ROBYN L. 
COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1990 
(1991).  A brief write-up of Cohen’s study is available at  
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/govpubs/prsn90.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). 
39 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 269. 
40 McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means, supra note 7, at 37. 
41 By 1990, England alone was imprisoning more people than any other Western European 
country.  Lilly & Knepper, An International Perspective, supra note 6, at 180.  The United 
Kingdom’s prisoner population leveled off in the early 1990s, but strong growth resumed 
thereafter.  HOME OFFICE, supra note 3, at 4 (Figure 1.1), 6 (Figure 1.3), available at 
www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm57/5743/5743.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). 
42 Id. at 180. 
43 Id.  
44 A. KEITH BOTTOMLEY ET AL., RESEARCH AND STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, HOME OFFICE FOR 
THE UNITED KINGDOM, MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF WOLDS REMAND PRISON AND 
COMPARISONS WITH PUBLIC-SECTOR PRISONS, IN PARTICULAR HMP WOODHILL 9 (1997).  
45 Reportedly, a 1991 Council of Europe probe condemned the standards of many British 
remand prisons as “inhuman.”  Lilly & Knepper, An International Perspective, supra note 6, at 189 
n.17.  
46 Rutherford, supra note 6, at 44-46. 
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regime improvement.  Privatization emerged as a response to both of 
these demands.  As the United States and the United Kingdom each 
undertook one of the biggest prison building programs in its history 
during the 1980s, recruiting the private sector in the effort offered a 
chance to expand capacity more quickly and possibly more cheaply.47  
In the United Kingdom, the 1988 Green Paper on remand prisons, 
for example, argued that private contractors could add “a new 
dimension of urgency and flexibility to the prison building 
programme.”48  Private contractors could add even more urgency 
and flexibility in the United States because most U.S. state 
governments finance prison construction through bond issues, which 
are usually subject to voter approval by referendum.  Throughout the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, citizens often voted down prison bonding 
proposals even as they were simultaneously demanding that more 
criminals be imprisoned.49  State officials therefore began to bypass 
voter referenda for bond issues, resorting instead to lease-buyback 
arrangements with private firms for the design, construction, 
management, and financing of prisons, which allowed rent payments 
to be paid out of the operational state budget instead of capital 
accounts.50  Because the United Kingdom’s centralized prison system 
draws its financial resources from general taxation, there is no need 
for express voter approval of prison-related expenditures and so this 
ease-of-financing motivation for private prison construction was not 
pertinent there.  Yet by the mid-1990s the DCMF model had won out 
in the United Kingdom too, as prison administrators on both sides of 
the Atlantic sought to avoid up-front capital outlays, induce price 
competition among bidding contractors, and shift design and 
construction risks to the private sector.51 
                                                
47 Expansion of prison capacity had come at a large financial cost in both countries.  In the 
United States, for instance, federal and state prison systems allocated 14.5 percent more money 
for new facilities or additions in 1991-92 than they had in 1989-90, while in the United 
Kingdom, Home Office spending on jails increased almost 55 percent from 1988-89 to 1989-90.  
Lilly & Knepper, An International Perspective, supra note 6, at 180. 
48 HOME OFFICE, supra note 20, at para. 9. 
49 See Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 270; McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private 
Means, supra note 7, at 32. 
50 Although some of the earliest private prison arrangements in the United States involved 
only the private sector management of prisons built and owned by the state, the DCMF contract 
soon became the standard model.  In McDonald et al.’s 1997 inventory of private prisons in the 
U.S., 50 of the 84 facilities were privately owned and subject to DCMF contracts.  MCDONALD ET 
AL., supra note 5, at 20.    
51 See Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 270-71. 
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In addition to easier (for U.S. states) and potentially cheaper 
financing of new prison construction, many correctional officials in 
both countries believed privatization would yield cost savings through 
reduced operational expenditure.  Early government-sponsored 
reports on prison privatization in the United States52 and the United 
Kingdom53 put forward the standard argument that private firms’ 
profit motives would allow them to carry out imprisonment tasks 
more cost-efficiently.  Correctional agencies expected these efficiency 
gains from contracting to save them money every year.  Some U.S. 
states made this expectation explicit, as in Florida’s statutory 
requirement that its Correctional Privatization Commission “may not 
enter into a contract . . . unless [it] determines that the contract or 
series of contracts in total for the facility will result in a cost savings to 
the state of at least seven percent over the public provision of a 
similar facility.”54 
In light of the deteriorating conditions of confinement in the 
public prisons, privatization also offered the possibility for prison 
reform, though this argument featured much more prominently in 
the British debate than in America’s.55  There were many variants of 
this argument, but generally privatization advocates argued that the 
management experience, results-driven culture, and enhanced 
accountability mechanisms of private contractors would enable them 
to deliver prison services of higher quality, as well as lower cost.  
Although the Prison Service did not face court orders to improve 
prison conditions as did many U.S. states, these arguments gained 
traction in the United Kingdom after a number of disturbances 
rocked its public prisons throughout the 1980s, culminating in the 
nearly month-long riot in 1990 at Risley—the “notoriously squalid”56 
remand prison near Manchester.  The Risley riot cemented the sense 
of a crisis in corrections and prompted one of the most thorough 
                                                
52 JOAN MULLEN ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
CORRECTIONS (1985). 
53 DELOITTE, HASKINS & SELLS, supra note 21. 
54 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 957.07 (West 1993). 
55 That privatization will lead to positive changes in prisoner treatment and prison 
conditions is, of course, not a foregone conclusion; many have argued it will do just the 
opposite.  For a good summary of the arguments on either side of this debate, see LOGAN, supra 
note 6. 
56 Tony Ward, Privatization in the British and American Penal Systems, 4 EUROCRIMINOLOGY 51, 
55 (1992). 
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reviews ever of the British prison system, conducted by Lord Woolf.57  
It also served to bolster the government’s commitment to better care 
for inmates, especially in remand prisons, through whatever means 
possible.  When invitations to tender for the running of The Wolds 
remand prison were issued to private firms in 1991, the 
accompanying Home Office document emphasized “the opportunity 
this presented for providing a constructive regime and for 
developing a fresh approach to the treatment of remand prisoners.”58  
By equating privatization with better performance, privatization 
advocates in the United Kingdom were able to assume the moral 
high ground in the debate over prison reform by claiming that critics 
who argued no one ought to profit from punishment were placing an 
ideological preference for the public sector over the very real needs 
of prisoners.59 
In the United Kingdom, the idea of cross-fertilization—that 
having a private sector role would force the public sector to improve 
its performance—became institutionalized in the 1990s in the form 
of “market testing.”60  After the first two private prison contracts were 
awarded for The Wolds and Blakenhurst, the Home Office began to 
allow, and sometimes force, the Prison Service to compete with 
private firms for management contracts, thereby testing its market 
viability as a prison owner/operator in a consistent, explicit way.  As 
Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke argued in a newspaper editorial at 
the time, the Home Office believed that doing so would yield cross-
fertilization benefits:  “[m]arket testing will . . . cause the prison 
                                                
57 LORD JUSTICE WOOLF, PRISON DISTURBANCES, APRIL 1990: REPORT OF AN INQUIRY BY THE 
RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE WOOLF AND HIS HON. JUDGE STEPHEN TUMIN (1991).  
58 BOTTOMLEY ET AL., supra note 44, at 10.  This tender document thus evoked the Home 
Affairs Committee’s argument in the United Kingdom’s first government report on prison 
privatization that the “problems of out of date and overcrowded prisons” could not be 
overcome by the present system and “given the squalor of the state provided system [of 
remand] there is no reason to suppose that privately managed institutions could not improve 
conditions to the benefit of inmate and public alike.”  HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 
19, at vii. 
59 See, e.g., PETER YOUNG, ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, THE PRISON CELL: THE START OF A 
BETTER APPROACH TO PRISON MANAGEMENT (1987); Kenneth Clarke, Prisoners with Private 
Means, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 22, 1992, at 17; Max Taylor & Ken Pease, Private Prisons and 
Penal Purpose, in PRIVATIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 178 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989). 
60 McConville had been the first to discuss cross-fertilization as a potential benefit of 
private prisons.  Sean McConville, Aid from Industry? Private Corrections and Prison Overcrowding, 
in AMERICA’S CORRECTIONAL CRISIS 221, 240 (Stephen D. Gottfredson & Sean McConville eds., 
1987).  In the United States, request-for-proposal competition for prison management has 
typically been limited to private firms. 
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service to examine its own performance in the light of competitive 
pressure and encourage the spread of those reforms across public 
sector prisons much more quickly than would otherwise have been 
the case.”61   
In the United States, by contrast, the issue of improving prisons 
and correctional regimes did not play a significant role in the 
privatization debate.62  Following the “nothing works” doctrine made 
famous by Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks,63 widespread 
disillusionment over the potential for prisoner rehabilitation had 
diminished the public’s interest in prison services and increased its 
interest in deterrence and (especially) incapacitation.64  Accordingly, 
the improvement of prisons “was seen as a possible and desirable, but 
not essential, by-product of better and more cost-effective [private] 
management.”65  In the American privatization discourse, private 
prisons were conceived of as supplementary to the overstretched 
existing facilities, not as partners in the system that could provoke 
widespread reforms.66   
 
B.  Political and Ideological Considerations 
The prison privatization movements of the United States and the 
United Kingdom each reflected a combination of pragmatic and 
political/ideological motivations, but in the United Kingdom 
political/ideological motivations loomed larger than they did in the 
United States.  In the face of rising crime rates, both countries’ 
governments were concerned to look tough on crime in the 1980s 
                                                
61 Clarke, supra note 59, at 17. 
62 McDonald et al. administered a survey on the last day of 1997 in which they asked 28 
directors of U.S. state correctional agencies that were contracting with private firms to rank 
their objectives in doing so.  Only one director ranked “[i]mproving caliber of services” as his 
first objective, while fourteen directors and eight directors ranked “[r]educe overcrowding” 
and “[o]perational cost savings,” respectively, as their first objective.  MCDONALD ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 15-17. 
63 DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF 
TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975). 
64 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995); Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The 
Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1 (2003); 
Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: 
THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 227 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman 
eds., 1995). 
65 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 272. 
66 See Sparks, supra note 6. 
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and early 1990s, and they therefore supported stiffer sentences and 
the building of more prisons.67  More generally, the Republican 
platform under Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush and the 
Conservative (New Right) platform under Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major stressed the virtues of competition, fiscal restraint, and 
an ethic of “managerialism,” with a focus on efficiency and outputs, 
rather than the old ethic of “bureau-professionalism.”68  These values 
translated into an attachment to private sector involvement in service 
provision; Thatcher’s government, in particular, had what one 
commentator described as “a pathological . . . antipathy to the public 
sector per se, accompanied by a largely untested belief that the quest 
for profits automatically increased the economic efficiency of 
virtually any enterprise.”69  The first wave of privatization under 
Thatcher primarily took the form of denationalization, with the state-
owned enterprises British Aerospace, British Airways, British Gas, 
British National Oil, and British Telecom all sold to private buyers.  
Prison privatization occurred in the second wave of British 
privatization, in which the Thatcher administration challenged the 
government’s monopoly over ostensibly core functions in fields like 
education, health care, and corrections.  Because the deprivation of a 
citizen’s liberty constitutes such an awesome manifestation of the 
state’s power and because the degree of control prisons exert over 
their inmates is so great, many agreed with Charles Logan that 
private prisons represented in the 1980s—and still represent today—
“an especially significant part of the broader privatization 
movement.”70   
They also represented an especially significant victory for the 
Thatcher administration.  With a smaller, more slowly growing 
incarcerated population than the United States (by proportional as 
well as absolute measures), with less prison overcrowding and less 
legal pressure to reduce it, and with weaker fiscal incentives in favor 
of private prison construction, the United Kingdom did not have as 
strong pragmatic reasons for privatizing prisons as did the United 
States.  Instead, as Mick Ryan and Tony Ward assert, prison 
                                                
67 See Ward, supra note 56, at 51-55. 
68 See generally DESMOND S. KING, THE NEW RIGHT: POLITICS, MARKETS AND CITIZENSHIP 
(1987); Ruth Levitas, Competition and Compliance: The Utopias of the New Right, in THE IDEOLOGY 
OF THE NEW RIGHT (Ruth Levitas ed., 1986). 
69 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 19.  
70 LOGAN, supra note 6, at 4. 
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privatization came “on the agenda because the New Right want[ed] 
the state to do less as a matter of principle.”71  Under Reagan and 
Bush, the United States also experienced a marked trend towards 
privatization in the 1980s and early 1990s, and this helped establish a 
climate conducive to the introduction and expansion of private 
prisons.72  However, with a federal government under divided 
Republican and Democratic control and with responsibility for 
prison management diffused over literally thousands of county, state, 
and federal agencies, the administrations’ ideological attachment to 
privatization could not transform the whole prison system in the way 
that it could in the United Kingdom.  Prison privatization came 
about in the United States as the product of dozens of disparate cost-
benefit calculations by prison administrators, perhaps influenced but 
certainly not led by a governing ideology.  In the United Kingdom, 
on the other hand, Conservative members of parliament had to press 
the case for private prisons in a single, public forum in the face of 
fierce opposition.73  As a result, the debate over prison privatization 
in the United Kingdom was more transparent, more concentrated, 
and more overtly political.  It served as a sort of ideological 
battleground on which the New Right challenged some of the most 
fundamental assumptions about state provision while the Labour 
Party and the penal lobby defended one of the few remaining purely 
public services from private sector encroachment. 
Further evidence for the ideological tenor of Britain’s prison 
privatization movement can be found in the influence of the Adam 
Smith Institute (ASI), a right-wing think tank that came to 
prominence during Thatcher’s tenure.  Whereas in the United States 
                                                
71 RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at 2. 
72 Most concretely, the President’s Commission on Privatization, convened by Reagan’s 
executive order in 1987, argued that “contracting should be regarded as an effective and 
appropriate form for the administration of prisons and jails at the federal, state, and local 
levels” and recommended that “proposals to contract for the administration of entire facilities 
at the federal, state, or local level ought to be seriously considered.”  PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION 
ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION 149-50 (1988). 
73 Virtually the entire British penal lobby—from the Prison Service, to the Prison Officers’ 
Association, to the prisoners’ union PROP, to the Prison Reform Trust, to the Howard 
League—opposed privatization.  See RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at xii.  There were many 
opponents of prison privatization in the United States as well, such as the National Sheriffs’ 
Association, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the National 
Prison Project of the ACLU, and the American Bar Association, but there were also many U.S. 
correctional administrators who supported privatization.  Id. at xii, 31-34. 
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the initial stimulus for private prisons came mainly from 
entrepreneurs who were promoting their own correctional-services 
ventures, in the United Kingdom the earliest proposals for private 
prisons came from pressure groups like the ASI and policy reformers 
like Sean McConville and Eryl Hall-Williams.74  In its 1984 report, The 
Omega File: Justice Policy,75 the ASI made a zealous case for prison 
privatization and put the issue on Britain’s political agenda for the 
first time.  The organization continued to play a leading role in 
promoting prison privatization throughout the 1980s.76  Its ideas 
were picked up by the Conservative Study Group on Crime,77 and 
they were aggressively championed within the Conservative Party by 
MP Michael Forsyth.78  The ASI lent the notion of private prisons a 
measure of intellectual legitimacy in the United Kingdom, and its 
single-minded push for privatization created a sense of urgency and a 
flow of policy proposals on which politicians could draw. 
The British New Right’s interest in private prisons also had a more 
concrete motivation:  it saw them as a tool to help break the power of 
the Prison Officers’ Association (POA), one of the few trade unions 
that had not already been marginalized since Thatcher came to 
power in 1979.79  Anne Owers, the current HM Chief Inspector of 
Prisons, reflects that “twenty years ago, the POA ran prisons. . . . 
Their staffing levels could sometimes be ridiculously high.”80  
Richard Harding has documented the POA’s long-standing 
obstructionism to meaningful prison reforms through artificial 
enhancements of overtime payments and through resistance to the 
introduction of rehabilitative and vocational programs.81  The New 
                                                
74 See ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, supra note 18; MCCONVILLE & HALL-WILLIAMS, supra note 18. 
75 ADAM SMITH INSTITUTE, supra note 18. 
76 RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at 44-47; Ward, supra note 56, at 51. 
77 See CONSERVATIVE STUDY GROUP ON CRIME, PRISONS (1986). 
78 RYAN & WARD, supra note 5, at 47. 
79 The POA, unsurprisingly, opposed privatization from the start.  See id. at xii, 51; Porter, 
supra note 6, at 74.  After sending representatives to make a tour of private prisons in the 
United States, the POA submitted a memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee of the 
House of Commons in February 1987 that attacked the conditions of confinement in the 
prisons it had visited and questioned their corporate operators’ long-term motivations.  See 
Porter, supra note 6, at 76. 
80 Anne Owers, unpublished, personal communication following speaking event at Trinity 
College, Oxford University (May 21, 2003) (on file with author). 
81 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 20, 134-36.  
Some have recently suggested that the POA may have tried to undermine the performance of 
certain private prisons in the 1990s by creating bureaucratic obstacles and withholding 
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Right’s general ideological aversion to unionized labor was thus 
reinforced in the case of the POA by specific complaints about the 
union’s historic behavior, and in its quest to break the POA’s 
influence the government found support, at least in the beginning, 
from prison reformers who saw the POA as an obstacle to progress.82  
In the United States, the relative weakness of unions, even in public 
sector employment, meant that this issue never became as important 
as in the United Kingdom.  American correctional officials were 
interested in gaining more control over their labor force, but they 
saw this as an ancillary benefit of privatization, not as a compelling 
rationale in its own right.  
 
IV.  PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE RESULTS 
 
While researchers in the United States and the United Kingdom 
have conducted numerous comparisons between public and private 
prisons, they have focused almost exclusively on cost and quality-of-
confinement measures and their findings have tended to be 
inconclusive.83  Recidivism outcomes and prisoners’ opinions have 
                                                                                                            
resources.  LORD LAMING, TARGETED PERFORMANCE INITIATIVE WORKING GROUP, MODERNISING 
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PRISON SERVICE (2000); DAVID RAMSBOTHAM, HM INSPECTORATE OF 
PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON BUCKLEY 
HALL (Feb. 2000).  If true, such behavior would constitute a serious and pernicious form of 
obstructionism.  
82 See HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 20. 
83 Representative examples from the United States include: WILLIAM G. ARCHAMBEAULT & 
DONALD R. DEIS, JR., COST EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISONS OF PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC PRISONS IN 
LOUISIANA: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF ALLEN, AVOYELLES, AND WINN CORRECTIONAL 
CENTERS (1996); HARRY HATRY ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, COMPARISON OF PRIVATELY AND 
PUBLICLY OPERATED CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES IN KENTUCKY AND MASSACHUSETTS (1989); 
CHARLES H. LOGAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, WELL KEPT: COMPARING QUALITY OF 
CONFINEMENT IN A PUBLIC AND A PRIVATE PRISON (1991); CHARLES W. THOMAS, ARIZONA 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, COMPARING THE COST AND PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE PRISONS IN ARIZONA (1997) available at 
http://web.crim.ufl.edu/pcp/research/Ariz.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003); Samuel J. Brakel, 
Prison Management, Private Enterprise Style: The Inmates’ Evaluation, 14 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 175 (1988); Charles H. Logan & Bill W. McGriff, Comparing Costs of Public 
and Private Prisons: A Case Study, 216 NIJ RESEARCH IN BRIEF REPORTS 2 (1989); Douglas C. 
McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional Facilities, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 86 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990).  Representative examples from the 
United Kingdom include: BOTTOMLEY ET AL., supra note 44; ISABELLE PARK, RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE 
COSTS AND PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY OPERATED PRISONS 1998-99 (2000), 
available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hosb600.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003); JO 
WOODBRIDGE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE COSTS AND PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY 
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typically been ignored, and the empirical analysis has often been 
subject to serious methodological concerns.  In a representative 
lament, one oft-cited survey of research on prison privatization in the 
United States found most of the studies comparing public and 
private facilities to be “fundamentally flawed,”84 and in a similar 
survey Kenneth Avio noted, “[t]o date, the empirical evidence 
comparing private and public management of [correctional] 
facilities has been scant and somewhat unsatisfactory.”85  Given these 
weaknesses in the comparative literature, it is difficult to reach any 
definitive conclusions about how successful prison privatization has 
been in the United States and the United Kingdom.  What evidence 
we have, however, suggests that private prisons have a decent if 
patchy record in the United States, while in the United Kingdom 
their performance has at least equalled and probably outpaced that 
of the public sector.86  
On one of the most conspicuous measures of prison 
performance—rates of escapes—private prisons in both countries 
seem to be doing at least as well as their public counterparts.87  In the 
United Kingdom, private prisons have had similar rates of intra-
prison assaults to those in public prisons.88  There have, however, 
been small-scale riots at Parc and Doncaster prisons in the U.K., and 
several major riots in U.S. private prisons—the best-known one 
                                                                                                            
OPERATED PRISONS 1997-98 (1999), available at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hosb1399.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).  There have 
been many more comparative studies performed in the United States, reflecting the greater 
size, diversity, and longevity of America’s private prison sector. 
84 Gaes et al., The Performance of Privately Operated Prisons: A Review of Research, in PRIVATE 
PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE app. 2, at 31 (Douglas C. 
McDonald et al. eds., 1998).   
85 Kenneth L. Avio, The Economics of Prisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 151 (1998), available 
at http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0929-1261 (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). 
86 As a number of thorough meta-analyses of public/private studies already exist, I do not 
attempt to summarize here all of the studies’ findings.  SHICHOR, supra note 6; Gaes et al., supra 
note 84; Charles W. Thomas and Charles H. Logan, The Development, Present Status, and Future 
Potential of Correctional Privatization in America, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 213 
(Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993).  I focus instead on the broad pattern of the findings, with 
particular concern for the most recent results. 
87 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 287. 
88 PARK, supra note 83, at 26; WOODBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 36.  No reliable comparative 
evidence exists in the United States or the United Kingdom about inmate suicides, but in 
Australia suicide rates in private and public prisons have been similar.  David Biles & Vicki 
Dalton, Deaths in Private Prisons 1990-99: A Comparative Study, 120 TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME AND 
CRIM. JUSTICE 1 (1999).        
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occurring at a Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) managed 
facility in Youngstown, Ohio in 1998.  Yet because “only fragmentary 
information is readily available about public sector prison troubles,”89 
it is difficult to infer too much from these disturbances. 
On cost and quality grounds, studies in the United States have 
typically concluded that private prisons performed as well as or better 
than the comparator public prisons.90  Looking at cost-efficiency 
from a governmental perspective, studies in Arizona91 and Florida92 
found no strong evidence of private prisons offering significant cost 
savings, while studies in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas found that 
contracting did reduce costs to the correctional agencies.93  The U.S. 
General Accounting Office concluded that, nationwide, the existing 
evidence on cost performance was inconclusive.94  Looking at 
prisons’ performance through data on a variety of quality measures—
such as administrative compliance, escapes, suicides, assaults on staff 
and inmates, educational and vocational programming, and health 
services—studies in Louisiana and Tennessee found broad parity 
between the public and private sectors,95 while studies in New Mexico 
                                                
89 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 290. 
90 Research comparing the recidivism rates of public and private facilities has been 
negligible; only one such study, by Lanza-Kaduce and Parker, has garnered any critical 
attention, and it has been roundly disparaged for its small sample size and erroneous matching 
of public and private releasees.  LONN LANZA-KADUCE & KAREN F. PARKER, A COMPARATIVE 
RECIDIVISM ANALYSIS OF RELEASEES FROM PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS IN FLORIDA (1998).  The 
key criticisms are FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, BUREAU OF RESEARCH AND DATA 
ANALYSIS, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF A STUDY ENTITLED: ‘A COMPARATIVE RECIDIVISM 
ANALYSIS OF RELEASEES FROM PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN FLORIDA’ (1998); Gaes et al., supra 
note 84.  These criticisms remain salient for the subsequent, published version of the study.  
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releasees from Private and Public 
Prisons, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 28 (1999). 
91 THOMAS, supra note 83. 
92 FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY, REVIEW OF BAY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND MOORE HAVEN CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITY (1998). 
93 ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 83 (studying Louisiana); TENNESSEE LEGISLATURE, 
FISCAL REVIEW COMMITTEE, COST COMPARISON OF CORRECTIONAL CENTERS (1995) (studying 
Tennessee); TEXAS LEGISLATURE, SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 
GOVERNOR OF TEXAS AND MEMBERS OF THE 72ND LEGISLATURE: FINAL REPORT (1991) (studying 
Texas).  
94 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING 
OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE (1996). 
95 ARCHAMBEAULT & DEIS, supra note 83 (studying Louisiana); TENNESSEE LEGISLATURE, 
SELECT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS, COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF PRIVATELY 
MANAGED CCA PRISON AND STATE-MANAGED PROTOTYPICAL PRISON (1995) (studying 
Tennessee). 
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and Florida found superior performance on average under private 
management.96  Douglas McDonald et al. conducted a national 
survey of private prison contract administrators, who were asked to 
rate the quality of service of the private prisons they oversaw.97  Sixty-
eight of 80 respondents reported that the contractors’ performance 
met contractual requirements, and 58 respondents reported that the 
private prisons had an equal quality of service to comparable facilities 
operated by government correctional agencies.98  McDonald et al.’s 
national findings corroborate the more localized findings of other 
American studies:  “[i]n general, it appears that state and federal 
governments are getting what they ask for in privately operated 
prisons, with some notable exceptions.”99 
The United Kingdom has also had examples of good and bad 
private prisons, but overall its experience with privatization seems 
more positive than negative.  In his recent report on improving 
prison management in the United Kingdom, Lord Laming provoked 
no controversy by stating, “[t]o date the performance of the private 
sector has been encouraging.”100  Initially, private prisons in the 
United Kingdom generated significant cost savings for the state both 
per prisoner and per certified place, but since the mid-1990s there 
has been a convergence between private and public sector costs.101  
The most recent comparative study sponsored by the Home Office 
found that privately operated prisons offered an average savings of 13 
percent in cost per prisoner in 1998-99, but little or no savings after 
accounting for their greater rates of overcrowding.102  Despite this 
overcrowding, the study also found that private prisons’ regimes were 
of similar quality to regimes in public prisons, except the “privately 
operated facilities tended to provide more purposeful activity and 
                                                
96 LOGAN, supra note 83 (studying New Mexico); THOMAS, supra note 83 (studying Florida). 
97 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 5, at 47-56. 
98 On the former survey question (about meeting contractual requirements), three private 
prisons were rated as exceeding requirements, and ten were seen as failing to meet 
requirements.  On the latter question (about quality of service in private versus public prisons), 
ten private prisons were thought to exceed the performance of the public prisons, and twelve 
were deemed inferior.  Id. at 53.   
99 Id. at 56. 
100 LAMING, supra note 81, at 19, para. 8. 
101 PARK, supra note 83, at 1; WOODBRIDGE, supra note 83, at 1. 
102 PARK, supra note 83, at 3-4. 
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out of cell hours than their comparators, and more flexible visiting 
hours.”103 
Chief Inspectors’ reports over the last decade have often praised 
the performance of private prisons in the United Kingdom, with two 
glaring exceptions:  Blakenhurst and, more recently, the juvenile 
prison Ashfield.104  Of the last five inspection reports on private 
prisons published by the Chief Inspector, three gave the 
management highly positive reviews—at Doncaster, The Wolds, and 
Forest Bank—and one gave the management at Parc a fairly positive 
review.105  When evaluating Ashfield, however, Owers remarked,  
 
this report is probably the most depressing I have 
issued during my time as Chief Inspector.  It describes 
an establishment that was failing, by some margin, to 
provide a safe and decent environment for children, or 
to equip the young people in it with the education, 
training and resettlement opportunities that are 
supposed to be at the core of their sentences.106   
 
In a subsequent speech, Owers seemed to find Ashfield’s 
performance disturbing, but not indicative of any broader failures in 
the private sector:  “[Ashfield] was the worst, but some of the best 
prisons I’ve inspected have been private ones.”107  Owers’ 
                                                
103 Id. at 26. 
104 DAVID RAMSBOTHAM, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON BLAKENHURST (May 2001); ANNE OWERS, HM 
INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM 
PRISON AND YOUNG OFFENDER INSTITUTION ASHFIELD (Oct. 2002).  Along with Buckley Hall, 
Blakenhurst is one of the two privately operated prisons in the United Kingdom to have had its 
contract cancelled and its (direct) management turned over to the Prison Service.  In the case 
of Buckley Hall, however, this cancellation occurred in spite of the Chief Inspector calling its 
corporate managers and staff “constructive and humane” and appraising it “a thoroughly good 
prison.”  RAMSBOTHAM, supra note 81, at 3.    
105 ANNE OWERS, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON AND YOUNG OFFENDER INSTITUTION DONCASTER (Sept. 2001); 
ANNE OWERS, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON THE WOLDS (Oct. 2001); ANNE OWERS, HM INSPECTORATE OF 
PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON AND 
YOUNG OFFENDER INSTITUTION FOREST BANK (Aug. 2002); ANNE OWERS, HM INSPECTORATE OF 
PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON PARC (Nov. 
2002). 
106 OWERS, ASHFIELD, supra note 104, at 3. 
107 Anne Owers, unpublished, speaking event at Trinity College, Oxford University (May 
21, 2003) (on file with author). 
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predecessor, moreover, considered the privately operated Altcourse 
prison the best he had seen:  “Altcourse is, by some way, the best 
local prison that we have inspected during my time as HM Chief 
Inspector.”108 
Beyond private prisons’ own performance record, their 
introduction in the United Kingdom also seems to have generated 
considerable cross-fertilization benefits in the Prison Service’s public 
prisons.  In the same speech, Owers commented that “[p]rivate 
sector prisons have been a way of changing practice . . . to be more 
forward-looking and flexible, including in the public sector.”109  
Similarly, a Prison Service governor, discussing improvements in the 
efficiency and quality of public prisons over the past decade, recently 
acknowledged that “[p]rivately operated prisons have played their 
part in this culture change.”110  The Laming Report documents a 
host of these improvements, using such indicators as escape rates, 
drug-testing results, and the quality of rehabilitative programs.111  
The Prison Service has also adopted a number of measures aimed at 
increasing cost-efficiency,112 which may help explain the convergence 
in private and public sector costs per prisoner that occurred over the 
latter part of the 1990s. 
 
V.  REGULATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
There has been an extensive debate in the literature about 
whether privately operated prisons will be more or less accountable 
to the state than publicly operated ones and how this will translate 
into cost and quality performance.113  Prison accountability can be 
enforced by governments through the mechanisms of public and 
private monitoring, litigation, accreditation, and contractual 
stipulations such as mandatory disclosure requirements.  Penal 
                                                
108 DAVID RAMSBOTHAM, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON ALTCOURSE 7 (Dec. 1999). 
109 Owers, supra note 107. 
110 Bennett, supra note 32, at 41. 
111 LAMING, supra note 81. 
112 See Bennett, supra note 32, at 40. 
113 See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EMERGING 
ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS (2001); HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9; LOGAN, supra note 6; YOUNG, supra note 59.  For a succinct 
summary of the arguments on either side of this debate, see LOGAN, supra note 6, at 41-48, 
available at http://www.ucc.uconn.edu/~wwwsoci/proscons.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). 
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officials and reformers seek more accountability in the prison system 
in order to improve the standard and efficiency of operations; to 
minimize the potential for corruption, prisoner abuse, and other 
illegal practices; to facilitate better comparisons between prisons; and 
to help avoid the problem of “agency capture,” in which regulators 
become more concerned to serve the interests of industry groups 
than some vague notion of the public interest.  On many levels, the 
accountability debate underlines the broader debate over whether 
private prisons can be more effective than public prisons and 
whether they can possess the same legitimacy. 
 
A.  Regulatory Strengths and Weaknesses 
Compared to the United States, the United Kingdom has 
instituted stronger administrative mechanisms for ensuring the 
accountability of its private prisons, although both countries’ systems 
of accountability suffer from conspicuous weaknesses.  In the United 
States, not all states statutorily require that private prison contracts 
provide for the appointment of a monitor, and many states that have 
such a statutory requirement do not specify what duties the monitor 
should have or grant the monitor autonomous status.114  Practices 
vary widely across jurisdictions; some state correctional departments 
maintain a full-time, on-site monitor at all private prisons, whereas 
some states have no on-site monitoring presence and only rare 
inspections by contract administrators.115  At the national level, there 
is no contract oversight unit or comparable body within the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons.  The primary mechanism by which government 
agencies in the United States monitor their private prison contracts is 
through American Correctional Association (ACA) accreditation:  at 
the end of 1997, 57 of the 91 private prison contracts in force in the 
United States required ACA accreditation within a specified time 
period, usually three years.116  Since then, the requirement of ACA 
accreditation has become nearly universal for private prisons, even in 
states where the public prisons are not required to be accredited.117  
                                                
114 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 39. 
115 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 5, at 50. 
116 Id. at 49.  Sixty-one of the contracts explicitly required compliance with conditions 
established in consent decrees or other court-mandated standards.  Id. 
117 See Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 315.  ACA accreditation requires twenty-one 
types of correctional facilities, including adult prisons, to meet all mandatory standards during 
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Although this does induce a measure of accountability in the private 
sector, the ACA has been frequently criticized for possible bias 
resulting from its dependence on fees from prison inspections, for 
the limited nature of its standards and inspections, and for its focus 
on policies and procedures rather than practices.118  Moreover, in 
most American private prisons no independent ombudsman exists to 
whom prisoners can complain about their treatment.  To the 
contrary, private prisons generally have wide discretion to discipline 
prisoners for on-site infractions, and critics have warned that these 
prisons may make deliberate attempts to maintain occupancy, and 
therefore profits, by making it more difficult for inmates to 
accumulate the “good behavior” points necessary for early release.119 
On the other hand, several aspects of prison regulation in the 
United States play a strong role in ensuring accountability.  Most 
notably, opportunities for litigation by both individual prisoners and 
by class actions (often initiated by watchdog groups on behalf of 
prisoners) create a safeguard against inmate abuses.  The threat of 
litigation may also help enforce contract compliance since prisoners 
can sue private prison operators for breaches of contractual 
standards.120  Unlike public employees, private employees in the 
United States are shielded neither by qualified immunity nor by the 
Eleventh Amendment, which prevents inmates from suing state 
employees in their official capacities for monetary damages.121  In 
April 1999, for example, CCA paid out 1.65 million dollars to 
prisoners who were affected by the riot in its Youngstown prison.122  
In addition, executives of private companies can be sued more easily 
and are less likely to be indemnified than government officials, and 
                                                                                                            
an inspection by an ACA audit team.  To remain accredited, a facility must pass inspection 
every three years.  Id. at 315-16. 
118 See, e.g., PAUL W. KEVE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MEASURING 
EXCELLENCE: THE HISTORY OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION 78-89 (1996); 
Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The Betrayal of Childhood in the United 
States, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 177, 193 (1996) (claiming the ACA’s standards fall short of international 
law’s human rights standards). 
119 See, e.g., BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 40 (1988). 
120 ROBBINS, supra note 6, at 648-55. 
121 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 
(1978).  
122 InterNet Bankruptcy Library, Inmates Litigation: D.C. Scatters Inmates from Troubled Ohio 
Prison, 3 CLASS ACTION REPORTER (2001), at http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/010514.mbx 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2003).   
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judges and juries tend to be less deferential to private companies.123  
Beyond the possibilities for legal redress, the United States also 
features relatively open access to private prison contracts, as state 
procurement laws typically require their public availability and 
publicly listed corporations must file annual reports with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  Finally, prison authorities in 
the United States have proven more willing than their peers in other 
countries to cancel contracts of under-performing operators.  
McDonald et al. document the cancellation of five state contracts in 
the early and mid-1990s,124 and Harding documents nine more 
cancellations of private prison contracts from 1995 to 2000.125 
Despite having more rigorous standards and processes of 
accountability overall than the United States, the British system of 
prison regulation also has several notable deficiencies.  For starters, 
British laws make it much more difficult for prisoners—in both 
private and public prisons—to sue over contractual noncompliance 
or mistreatment:  “U.K. . . . jurisprudence relating to prisoner 
litigation is, by comparison [to U.S. jurisprudence], stunted and 
ineffectual.  Class actions generally are doomed to fail.”126  Moreover, 
the British government allows financial information on private prison 
contractors to remain proprietary and confidential, which stifles 
efforts to make independent assessments of the relative costs and 
cost-effectiveness of their operations.127  And while the United 
Kingdom’s Inspectorate of Prisons does an admirable job evaluating 
prisons and publicizing its criticisms, it only has the power to make 
recommendations, not to enforce them.  The take-up rate of its 
suggestions has been notoriously poor; as Chief Inspector Owers 
recently remarked, “[m]ost of our recommendations do get 
accepted, but of course whether or not they get implemented is a 
different matter.”128  Finally, the U.K. Home Office has, to date, been 
                                                
123 See Low, supra note 64, at 41-42.  
124 MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 5, at 53. 
125 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 323. 
126 Id. at 322. 
127 See BOTTOMLEY ET AL., supra note 44, at 57; McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private 
Means, supra note 7, at 41.  Harding recounts the outrageous case of the Contracts and 
Competition Group in the United Kingdom commissioning research into the comparative 
efficiency of the first private prison (The Wolds) and a comparator public prison, only to 
withhold the relevant contract from the researchers whom it had commissioned to perform the 
research.  HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 70.  
128 Owers, supra note 107. 
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more reluctant than U.S. governmental agencies to cancel private 
prison contracts.  It has made only two such cancellations in over a 
decade, one of which was unrelated to the contractor’s 
performance.129 
However, the Home Office enforces accountability in other, 
powerful ways.  As provided for in the Criminal Justice Act 1991, the 
state has the power to veto any potential hire for any level of 
employment at a private prison, and it must positively authorize all 
private prison personnel before they can act in that capacity.130  In 
the United States, by contrast, most contracts allow private firms to 
make their own hires with little intrusion.  The Criminal Justice Act 
1991 also stipulates that every contracted prison in the United 
Kingdom must have its own controller, an appointed Crown Servant 
who investigates and reports on all allegations against correctional 
officers.  In practice, most private prisons have two controllers—
evidence of the resource-rich nature of monitoring in the United 
Kingdom.131  Because all disciplinary complaints against inmates by 
the prison staff must be made to the controller, the distinction 
between the allocation and administration of punishment is kept 
clearer within British private prisons, whose operators have no 
authority to make intra-prison disciplinary decisions on their own.132  
The United Kingdom also monitors its correctional facilities through 
a Prisons and Probation Ombudsman who has jurisdiction over all 
prisons and through independent monitoring boards, in addition to 
the inspections and reports by the Inspectorate of Prisons.  Taken 
together, these “U.K. arrangements amount to the strongest statute-
based accountability structure currently in existence.”133  Although 
the Ombudsman and the Chief Inspector have only recommendatory 
powers, their reports are followed closely by the media and play an 
important role in publicizing contractual violations and other 
                                                
129 See discussion in note 104 supra. 
130 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 314. 
131 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 46.  Harding 
contrasts this resource-rich monitoring situation to that of Florida in the United States.  
Florida, though known for its careful, structured approach to privatization, had only one 
monitor available for each contract site in the mid-1990s.  Without any administrative or 
secretarial assistance, the monitors were each responsible for almost 1,000 prisoners.  Id. at 43-
44. 
132 Moyle, supra note 6, at 87. 
133 HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 40. 
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performance problems.  Reports by the Chief Inspector aim to hold 
prisons to an international human rights standard, they discuss 
negative findings with candor, and in addition to reviewing 
quantitative performance results they also feature a substantial 
qualitative component, including prisoner interviews. 
This impressive methodology for evaluating and monitoring 
prisons is reinforced by the Home Office’s approach to writing and 
enforcing contracts.  Compared to most American correctional 
agencies, the Home Office applies relatively prescriptive, output-
based contracts to its private prisons, demanding that they provide 
more rehabilitative and vocational programming than public prisons 
and setting measurable expectations for escape, suicide, and assault 
rates as well as a variety of health and nutrition outcomes.134  When 
private operators do not meet the terms of their contract, the Home 
Office has shown its willingness to withhold performance-linked fees.  
For instance, in the first six months of 1998 it withheld 
approximately £800,000 from Securicor Limited, operator of Parc 
prison, for failing to meet contractual requirements on numerous 
health and safety measures.  The amount of this fine would have 
accounted for Securicor’s whole operating profit budgeted for that 
period.135  As a result of such strict contract enforcement, by the end 
of 1999 the Chief Inspector was able to report that “Parc has largely 
overcome many of the problems with which it was beset.”136 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION: INCENTIVES AND REGULATORY REFORM 
 
To the surprise of their critics and the satisfaction of their 
supporters, private prisons have a reasonable track record in the 
United States and the United Kingdom so far.  In each country, 
private prisons appear to have performed as well as or possibly better 
than public prisons in terms of both cost-efficiency and quality of 
service.  Private prisons’ quality of service seems to have been 
particularly high in the United Kingdom.  In addition, there have not 
                                                
134 See HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 9, at 139-41; 
NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, THE OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF PFI PRISONS: REPORT BY THE 
COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL 1-2 (June 2003).  
135 Harding, Private Prisons, supra note 4, at 306. 
136 DAVID RAMSBOTHAM, HM INSPECTORATE OF PRISONS, HOME OFFICE FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, INSPECTION REPORT: HM PRISON PARC 1 (Oct. 1999).  See also Harding, Private 
Prisons, supra note 4, at 306. 
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been any major corruption scandals involving corrections firms, and 
there is no evidence that these firms have distorted or captured 
policymaking.  
Yet while private prisons have performed respectably in the 
aggregate, their results have been highly inconsistent—including the 
troubling examples of riots in several U.S. private prisons and abuses 
at Blakenhurst and Ashfield in the United Kingdom.  Rather than be 
seen as outliers, these breakdowns in prison management should be 
seen as indicative of the risks of contracting; with for-profit operators, 
a prison can quickly degenerate when its management is determined 
to save money by cutting corners and the government does not 
intervene.  Private prisons may have proven themselves more similar 
than dissimilar to public prisons over the last decade, but their 
greater risks place an added onus on regulators. 
The regulatory weaknesses in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, enumerated above, suggest areas where correctional 
officials ought to focus their reform efforts.  American officials 
should establish new systems for monitoring and inspection in most 
jurisdictions (or at least pressure the ACA to improve its 
accreditation process), they should write contracts that specify 
measurable outputs, and they should prohibit private prisons from 
making their own quasi-judicial decisions concerning complaints by 
and against prisoners.  Meanwhile, the U.K. Home Office should 
enhance public access to contractors’ financial information and 
implement policies that link contract administration to evaluations 
from the Chief Inspector.  Given the paucity of credible comparative 
evidence, regulators in both countries should also sponsor more data 
collection and research into the performance of private versus public 
prisons. 
Perhaps the most powerful reform regulators in either country 
could make, however, would be to create positive incentives for good 
performance.  Currently, the standard private prison contract in the 
United States and the United Kingdom remunerates the corporate 
operator based on the number of person-days of confinement 
supplied, subject to some minimal level of amenities.  The corporate 
operator thus has almost no contractual incentive to provide 
rehabilitation opportunities or educational/vocational training that 
might benefit inmates, except insofar as these services act to decrease 
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the current cost of confinement.137  Contracts in the United States 
and the United Kingdom will fine or possibly even terminate 
corporate operators for failures to meet certain requirements, but 
they will not reward operators for achieving performance goals; these 
contracts are all stick, no carrot.  As a result, they fail to capitalize on 
one of the potential advantages of the private sector—its willingness 
and ability to innovate in pursuit of profits.  If private prison 
operators stood to make money from, say, improving literacy or 
prisoner satisfaction rates, from reducing escapes or assaults, or from 
preventing drug use or the spread of disease, then they would likely 
find a way to achieve the necessary outcomes. 
Creating such fiscal incentives would be especially welcome as a 
tool to fight recidivism, perhaps the most destructive and intractable 
problem plaguing both countries’ correctional systems.138  Designing 
incentives to reduce recidivism would be difficult, but not impossible.  
By controlling for inmates’ exogenous propensity to re-offend, 
correctional agencies can model the proportion of a prison’s 
recidivism rate attributable to the prison itself, and then make 
compensation decisions accordingly.139  Short of fiscal incentives, 
even simply publicizing league tables of recidivism performance 
would create pressure for prisons to find recidivism-minimizing 
solutions.  In this way, not only would correctional agencies eliminate 
any “perverse incentives” for-profit prisons might have to stimulate 
                                                
137 See PETER SCHMIDT & ANN D. WITTE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE: 
THEORY, METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 345-46 (1984). 
138 The largest study yet of recidivism in the United States found that of the inmates 
released from state prisons, almost two-thirds were re-arrested for a felony or serious 
misdemeanor within three years of release.  ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989).  In the United 
Kingdom, 59 percent of all prisoners discharged in 1998 were reconvicted—not simply re-
arrested—for a standard list offense within two years of their discharge.  HOME OFFICE, supra 
note 3, at 152 (Table 9.1).  Considering that over 90 percent of all prisoners are eventually 
released back into society, such high recidivism rates exact an enormous social cost.  See 
RUDOLPH J. GERBER, CRUEL AND USUAL: OUR CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM (1999). 
139 For a discussion and examples of how to conduct such recidivism analysis, see Patrick J. 
Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public versus Private 
Management (July 2003), Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 863, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=441881 (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).  At present, the Florida 
Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) appears to be the only correctional agency in either 
country that evaluates its facilities based on their recidivism performance.  See FLORIDA 
DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, BUREAU OF DATA AND RESEARCH, 2003 OUTCOME 
EVALUATION REPORT (2003).  The Florida DJJ does not link facilities’ revenues to their 
recidivism performance, however, except through the possible elimination of particularly 
poorly performing facilities. 
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recidivism (in order to generate more future business),140 but they 
would also enlist these prisons’ profit motive in the fight against 
recidivism. 
As the private prison industry becomes more transnational141 and 
more consolidated and as overcrowding continues to increase the 
strain on facilities, it will become all the more important in the 
coming years for the United States and the United Kingdom to have 
effective prison management systems in place.  Correctional agencies 
in both countries need to confront existing weaknesses in their 
regulatory frameworks, they need to ensure the marketplace stays 
competitive and diverse, and they need to create a new breed of 
positive incentives for prisons to achieve performance targets.  Doing 
so would allow both countries to realize more of the potential 
benefits of privatization while minimizing the possibilities for abuse.  
With accountability better enforced, the public-versus-private debate 
would become less significant and people could return their 
attention to the broader questions of why we use incarceration and 
why we have so many prisons in the first place. 
                                                
140 See Avio, supra note 85, at 150 (discussing the economics of such “perverse incentives”). 
141 The United Kingdom’s correctional marketplace reveals just how transnational the 
industry has become: all four of the private companies that are currently operators of British 
prisons—Group 4 Prison Services Limited, UK Detention Services, Premier Prison Services, and 
Securicor Custodial Services—are local subsidiaries of multinational corporations.  
Respectively, their parent companies are based in Denmark, France, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom.  COMPETITION COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 3.131-3.148, 4.20-4.60. 
